Yes, and I have read it, but where in his texts on Christ does he use Aristotelian metaphysics?
Ok, so basically you neither understand what 'Aristotelian metaphysics' is, nor how the Fathers use it.
Let's take things back a bit and go to Chapter 4 of the Dialectica
Being is the common name for all things which are. It is divided into substance and accident. Substance is the principle of these two, because it has existence in itself and not in another. Accident, on the other hand, is that which cannot exist in itself but is found in the substance. For the substance is a subject, just as matter is of the things made out of it, whereas an accident is that which is found in the substance as in a subject. Copper, for example, and wax are substance; but shape, form and color are accidents. And a body is a substance; whereas color is an accident. For the body is certainly not in the color; rather, color is in the body. Nor is the soul in knowledge; rather, knowledge is in the soul. Nor are the copper and wax in the shape; rather, the shape is in the wax and the copper. Neither is the body said to belong to the color; rather, the color to the body. Nor does the wax belong to the shape; rather, the shape to the wax. What is more, the color and the knowledge and the shape are subject to change, whereas the body and the soul and the wax remain the same, because substance is not subject to change. Also, the substance and the matter of the body is just one thing, while there are many colors. Similarly, in the case of all other hings, the subject is substance, whereas that which is found in the substance as in a subject is accident.
Now, substance is defined as follows: Substance is a thing which exists in itself and has no need of another for its existence. Accident, however, is that which cannot exist in itself, but has its existence in another. God, then, is substance, and so is every created thing. God, however, even though He is substance, is super-substantial. There are also substantial qualities about which we shall have something to say.
An accident is that which may either be present or absent without destroying the subject. Again, it is that which can be or not be in the same thing. Thus, it is possible for a man to be white or not, and also for him to be tall, intelligent, flat-nosed or not. (For the presence of this does not save the species, becaust it does not belong to the definition of the species. Neither does its absence destroy the species. Thus, even though the Ethiopian is not white, this in no wise keeps him from being a man. And so, whether it is present or absent, it does not injure the subject substance-- for we have said that the substance is a subject and sort of matter for the accidents.)
The accident is divided into two kinds: that which is commonly called a difference and that which is properly a difference. What is commonly called a difference is the seperable accident. For example, one person is seated and another standing. Now, by the standing up of the one who is seated and the sitting down of the one who is standing it is possible for the original difference between the two to be removed and replaced by another difference. And one is also said to differ from oneself by a separable accident, for one does differ from oneself by sitting down and standing, by being young and growing old, by being sick and getting well, and so forth. A difference in the proper sense is the inseparable accident. For example, a person is snub-nosed and it is impossible to separate his snub-nosedness from him, and similarly with his being grey-eyed and the like. Thus, it is by these inseparable accidents that one individual, that is, one substance, differs from another. However, one's own self never differs from oneself. Now, the accidents do not enter into the definition (of the nature), because it is possible for a man to be snub-nosed or not, and, just because a man does not have grey eyes, he remains no less a man.
Genus and accident have this in common: that they are predicated of several things. Distinguishing peculiarities of genus and accident are: that the genus is prior to the species in which the accidents subsist,whereas the accidents are posterior to the species; that the accident exists antecedently in the individuals and consequently in the species, whereas the contrary is true of the genus; and that the genera are predecated of the essence of a thing, whereas the accidents are predicated of its sort, or how the thing is.
Difference and accident have this in common:that they are both predicated of several things as to what sort they are, and that the difference and the inseparable accident are always present in the things of which they are predicated. One of the distinguishing peculiarities of difference and accident is that the differences contain and are not contained, while the accidents are contained. For, on the one hand, both contain the species, as being predicated of several species; but the difference is not contained, because the same species does not admit of contradictory differences. On the other hand, the accident is contained, for the reason that the same species and the same individual will admit of several accidents which may oftentimes even be contradictory. Other distinguishing peculiarities are:that the difference does not admit of more or less, whereas the accidents on the contrary do, and that contradictory differences may not be combined, whereas contradictory accidents may.
Now, compare all this to what is said about accidents in the Isagoge
1. How is St John of Damascus not 'Aristotelian', within the trends of Aristotelian neo-Platonism as exemplified by Porphyry?
2. How is transubstantiation unacceptable, if we understand the technical terms in the way defined by the Damascene?