From the Wall Street Journal. May 25, 2007. International Edition. Pg. 13.
Written by my advisor, no less.
HOUSES OF WORSHIPChurch Merger, Putin's Acquisition
By NADIA KIZENKO
May 25, 2007
Last week, on the Christian feast of the Ascension, leaders of the
�migr�
Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia agreed to re-establish
"canonical
communion" with the Russian Orthodox Moscow Patriarchate. Thousands
stood
in line
to attend the celebration at Moscow's Cathedral of Christ the Savior.
But
this
was clearly an event of more than religious significance. The
attendees
were a veritable who's who of Russian political life, including Moscow
Mayor Yuri Luzhkov and President Vladimir Putin, the merger's
architect.
News media world-wide described the event as a step in overcoming
Russia's tragic history. The New York Times called the merger "the
symbolic end of Russia's civil war." But the reality is far more
complicated. Not only are there
theological and moral issues at stake, but there is also the suspicion
among some that Mr. Putin is building new networks of influence by
using
the church
to reach out to Russian �migr� communities all over the world.
One
church under Putin?
While lower-ranking clergy at the ceremony stressed the spiritual
aspects
of the merger, Patriarch Aleksy II emphasized other factors: He gave
short shrift to God, but thanked President Putin.
Indeed, it was Mr. Putin who first made overtures to the Church Abroad
in
September 2003, when he met with its leadership during a visit to New
York. The
church merger is only the most recent of his successful attempts to
appropriate symbols of Russia's prerevolutionary and anticommunist
past
along with
Soviet ones. The "repatriating" of the Danilov monastery bells from
Harvard University, and the bodies of the White Russian Gen. Anton
Denikin from Jackson,
N.J., and the Dowager Empress Maria Feodorovna from Copenhagen, have
gone
hand in hand with reintroducing the old Soviet anthem and the Red
Army's
flag.
Mr. Putin is thus the first modern Russian leader to incorporate all
aspects of Russia's "usable past" in claiming his legitimacy. The
Russian
Orthodox Church in all its forms is a key component of that past.
Now the Russian government is being heavily criticized for its
authoritarian behavior. Mr. Putin needs friends anywhere he can find
them. Having a ready-made network of 323 parishes and 20 monasteries in
the U.S. alone, and over a
million church members in 30 countries, will offer Russia greater
influence abroad. This is particularly true because, according to the
terms of the agreement, Moscow regains control over bishops'
appointments
and the right to
open or close all parishes.
Less clear-cut are the moral issues the merger raises, particularly
for
the American-based Church Abroad. From the time when Russia became
communist and atheist after 1917, the Church Abroad had sought to be
the
free voice of Russian Orthodoxy world-wide. Its independence was
authorized by the courageous
Patriarch Tikhon in 1920, who resisted Communist domination.
But in 1927, the Soviet government imprisoned the independent bishops
and
transferred leadership of the Russian Church to Metropolitan Sergii
(Stragorodsky), who infamously declared that the Soviet Union's "joys
and
successes
are
our joys and successes, and [its] sorrows are our sorrows."
From that moment,
the official bishops inside of Russia did not utter a word of public
protest to anything the state did, even though the country was
drenched
in the blood of tens of millions of people, many of whom were
believers,
and thousands of whom were clergy.
Instead, the leadership took to referring to Stalin as "the wise,
God-appointed leader of our Great Union." In 1930, when the ruthless
extermination of
the faithful was at a fever pitch, Sergii announced, "There never has
been religious persecution in the U.S.S.R., nor is there now."
Today's Moscow Patriarchate is the as-yet-unrepentant inheritor of
this
legacy. Rather than distancing himself from Sergii's appeasement,
Patriarch Aleksy wrote a lengthy foreword to a 2003 biography,
praising
the "heroic path"
taken by Sergii and viciously castigating the critics of this
appeasement
(including dissenting Orthodox groups in Russia and abroad). He has
blessed the
construction of a memorial complex in honor of Sergii, complete with a
square,
a museum and a monument. In 2005, Alexy wrote a congratulatory epistle
to
the
president of Vietnam on the occasion of 30 years since the communist
victory in the Vietnam War, calling it a "glorious anniversary."
Similar
letters were sent to the leaders of North Korea and Cuba.
As long as the Church Abroad existed as an independent entity, it
implicitly challenged the authority of Moscow to speak for the Russian
Church. It consistently denounced the collaboration of the church with
the Communist Party,
called for a more positive valuation of Russia's prerevolutionary and
anticommunist past and served as a hopeful beacon to Orthodox
Christians
in Russia
seeking an alternative.
Many in the Church Abroad wonder how this merger went through at all.
The
process was secretive, and there has even been speculation that some
American
businessmen with Russian ties helped to push it along. But now having
accepted
Moscow's authority, the former Church Abroad faces many questions. Can
its leaders press Moscow to reject the church's tradition of
collaborating with both the Kremlin and the KGB? Can they hold on to
the
church properties they have maintained for the past 80 years? Will the
Moscow Church dispatch pro-Kremlin clergy to promote political aims?
And,
above all, can the leaders of the
Church Abroad stem the tide of defection from the disappointed
faithful
that has already begun?
These problems may be averted if the Russian Church Abroad uses its
new
status to actively engage Moscow. But last week's glad-handing
suggests
that it
is the Kremlin, rather than heaven, that is smiling on this union.
Ms. Kizenko is an associate professor of history at the State
University
of New York at Albany.
